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COMMENTARIES
THE AMBIGUOUS WORK OF "NATURAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS"
Gregory S. Alexander
The three fascinating papers by Dick Helmholz, Jim Ely, and Mark
Tushnet prompt me to ask, why was there so much talk among late-
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American lawyers about property
as a "natural" right, and why has the language persisted today? More
specifically, what work is the rhetoric of "natural property rights" in-
tended to do? This is not the proper occasion for developing any-
thing like complete answers to those questions, but I do want to offer
three lines of thought that might begin to approach something like a
fuller explanation of the puzzling persistence of natural-property-
rights talk.
The first line of thought begins with a point that Dick Helmholz's
and Jim Ely's papers make.' They provide abundant evidence that in
the nineteenth century there was plenty of talk about natural rights.
Their papers also establish the fact that this natural-rights talk was
commonly associated with property. Prompted by Mark Tushnet's
paper,3 I want to ask, what do we do with this talk about property as a
natural right? What work does such talk do? What traction were
those who used such talk in the nineteenth century trying to get with
it? And more importantly, what traction are those today who point to
the conspicuous existence of such talk in the past trying to get with it?
The answer lies in the notion of a natural right, particularly the
natural right of property, as fundamental. Those who used natural-
rights talk in the nineteenth century and the modern-day chroniclers
of that nineteenth-century talk commonly associate the term natural
right with the term fundamental.
A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
James w. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation": The Evolution of Unenumerated
Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917 (2006); R. H. Helmholz, The
Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights in the United States, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L.
401 (2006).
2 Helmholz's paper importantly points out, however, that, although property was a locus for
much natural-law talk, natural-law thinkers had no canon of specific rights. He also notes that
"[i]n [early nineteenth century] practical jurisprudence, the law of nature was thought to play a
basic but limited role." Helmholz, supra note 1, at 402.
3 Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch Unenumerated Rights Drift, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 209 (2006).
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But this really just moves the question back a step. What traction
do the users of the term, "natural right as a fundamental right," think
they are getting by attaching the characterization fundamental to the
term natural right of property? The move is made, I think, to give the
constitutional right of property more bite than it currently has. The
goal is to make the constitutional property right, whether via the Due
Process Clause or the Takings Clause, the basis of resisting all manner
of regulation of a wide variety of economic interests.4 Labeling an
economic interest a fundamental natural right is a tactic aimed at end-
ing all further argument. By virtue of being covered by such a right,
the interest transcends all debate about the legitimacy of government
actions undertaken to achieve collective goals defined through the
processes of ordinary democratic politics. The interest is simply be-
yond such collective control, and that's the end of it.
There are, of course, a number of serious problems with this move
at the level of legal theory. When the move is made in a concrete
context, things get really tricky. First, the locution of individual
rights may distinguish between property as a natural (and unenumer-
ated) right and property as a fundamental (and unenumerated) right,
on the one hand, from property as an entrenched right. Gerald
Stourzh, in a paper that Dick Helmholz cites,5 distinguishes between
fundamental rights and entrenched rights. 6 A fundamental right may
be an entrenched right, but not necessarily. A right may be funda-
mental or natural not because it is in some special separate category
but simply because it is thought to be essential to the ordering of the
law of the land. Under this view, determining that property as a fun-
damental or natural right does little in reaching the ultimate goal of
immunizing property holdings from redistributive governmental
regulations. True, the abstract right to property, even though consti-
tutionalized, is recognized as constitutive of the legal order. But par-
ticular, concrete property interests or holdings need not be given the
kind of immunity that Professor Epstein and other practitioners of
the rhetoric of the natural right to property hope to secure through
their discursive tactic.
A second problem, as Helmholz's paper shows,7 is that the theory
of property as a natural or fundamental right is indeterminate. His-
torically, natural-law theory, both in general and in the context of
4 That this is the ultimate aim of such property talk is made most abundantly clear in, of
course, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
5 SeeHelmholz, supra note 1, at 419 n.123.
6 Gerald Stourzh, Fundamental Laws and Individual Rights in the 18th Century Constitution, in
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 159, 169-70 (J.
Jackson Barlow et al. eds., 1988).
7 Helmholz, supra note 1, at 413-16.
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property, had multiple valences.8 Although there was a lot of natural-
law talk about property, that very rhetoric could be and at times was
used not in favor of the minimalist nightwatchman state but against
that vision, specifically against the vision of immunizing property
holdings from collective interference. It might be used as the basis
for justifying the redistribution of property holdings, because, as
Helmholz puts it, "the government had a duty to establish good or-
der, sometimes even at the expense of the rights of individuals." 9 On
this view, the notion of property as a fundamental natural right has
been used not only in a negative respect, that is, to protect economic
rights against depradations by the state, as Jim Ely's paper discusses,
but also to ground a less familiar conception of property: property as
the foundation for the properly ordered society, or what in an earlier
book I called "property as propriety."0 By that, I mean a conception
of property according to which "property is [viewed as] the material
foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order, the
private basis for the common good."11
Many natural-law writers, including nineteenth-century American
legal writers, were "preoccup [ied] ... with theories of the common
good.1 2 Their theory of natural law was not the theory of the limited
state and vested rights, the stuff of Edward Corwin's classic account of
the "higher law" tradition, 13 but the theory "[t]hat man was made for
society... [and] that the public good ought always to be the supreme
rule .... "'4 On this social understanding of the law of nature, an un-
derstanding shared by several of the Founders and leading American
jurists, including James Wilson and Chancellor Kent,15 the purpose of
government was not to shield autonomous individuals from the state
8 See Bret Boyce, Property as a Natural Right and as a Conventional Right in Constitutional
Law 13, 24-26 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing views of property from
ancient times through the middle ages and the modem era as a less-than-absolute right with
corresponding social obligations).
9 Helmholz, supra note 1, at 412.
10 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 passim (1997).
11 Id. at 1.
1 WILLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURYAMERICA 28 (1996).
13 See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 2),
42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 366-71 (1929) (tracing to the Tudor period in England the roots of the
American constitutional idea that higher law limits legislative power); see also Edward S. Corwin,
The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REv. 247, 255 (1914) ("[T]he Doc-
trine of Vested Rights[,] ... setting out with the assumption that the property right is funda-
mental, treats any law impairing vested rights, whatever its intention, as a bill of pains and penal-
ties, and so, void.").
14 Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S
COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784, at 302, 312 n.1 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1935) (footnote
contributed by Samuel Loudon, editor of the original printing).
15 See NOVAK, supra note 12, at 29-31.
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so that they were free to pursue their subjective preferences. Rather,
individuals were inextricably bound to society and were obligated to
act in the best interests of the community as a whole. Natural law, on
this view, repudiated rather than promoted what C.B. Macpherson
called possessive individualism.' 6
The late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century proprietarian
understanding of property was premised directly on this version of
natural-law thinking. In the proprietarian tradition of property,
courts often found it entirely proper, indeed necessary, for the state
to impose legislative restrictions on the possession, use, or transfer of
certain items of property. These restrictions were valid, not simply as
a matter of convenience or expediency, but as a matter of protecting
the commonweal and vindicating the natural order of things-as a
matter of natural law. It was in just these terms, for example, that the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1877 rejected a constitutional challenge to a
Massachusetts law prohibiting the manufacture of, or trafficking in,
alcoholic beverages. 7  Indeed, the modern notion of the police
power owes its acceptance to this version of natural law and the rela-
tionship between natural law and the right of property.
From this perspective, Robin West's notion of "unenumerated du-
ties"'8 is particularly valuable. One way of understanding the public-
trust doctrine, for example, is in terms of the state's unenumerated
duty to maintain certain resources as open to the public. So, when
the Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois held that
the Contract Clause' 9 did not prohibit the Illinois state legislature
from revoking its earlier grant of submerged land along Chicago's
lakefront because the grant had violated the state's duty to hold the
land in trust for the public's benefit, ° it was not creating a new state
duty. In the Court's own view, it was simply recognizing a preexist-
ing-unenumerated-state duty, a duty that the state has always owed
to the public.2' Moreover, preexisting, natural duties to the public
may exist with respect not only to the state as property owner but also
to private owners. This is the theory that courts have used in recent
years to explain expanding public access to dry- as well as wet-sand
portions of beaches.2 Such property is inherently public, and the du-
16 C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE 3, 263-64 (9th prtg. 1983) (1962).
7 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877).
is Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 221 (2006).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 6.
20 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005) (concluding that, since "large
bodies of navigable water ... belong to the public," Michigan "lacks the power to diminish
those rights when conveying littoral property to private parties"), reh'g denied, 703 N.W.2d 188
[Vol. 9:2
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ties that its private owners owe the public preexist any act of positive
law.
There is a second sense in which the works that talk of property as
a natural or fundamental right are ambiguous. When we speak of the
right of property being a natural or unenumerated right, what pur-
poses or functions of property do we have in mind? Property serves
multiple functions, of course, and one may not think that they are all
equally important. So we might think that property for shelter, for
example, is more important than property used as the means for cre-
ating personal wealth. Distinctions of this sort might apply even
when we speak about rights that are commonly termed "economic
rights." For example, the right to an occupation, upon which Jim Ely
particularly focuses, obviously serves a wealth-creating function, but
there is more to the right than that alone. 4 Work is also a source of
dignity. It may also be said to be required for effective citizenship.
The point is that when we talk about property or economic rights
as being "natural," "fundamental," or "unenumerated," we may find it
necessary, or at least useful, to specify the function that the particular
asset or interest in question primarily serves. This sort of purposive
analysis of interests might, though it need not necessarily, lead us to
develop a kind of hierarchy of property functions according to which
the constitutional right of property is fundamental for some purposes
but not for others.25
(Mich. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (2006); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471
A.2d 355, 360 (NJ. 1984) ("[L]and covered by tidal waters belong[s] to the sovereign, but for
the common use of all the people." (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
821 (1984).
23 See, e.g., MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 988-91 (1982)
(distinguishing property rights essential to personhood from nonproperty rights and property
rights not essential to personhood). I realize that such lines cannot be drawn in any sort of
categorical way, and that the categories, even if I did create them, would quickly blur. But I do
not think that the fact that the categories blur means that the distinction is entirely unintelligi-
ble. Property for shelter includes one's home or apartment, and one's home is not simply a
wealth-creating asset, even though many people may use it for that function as well. Few people
think of the home they own and in which they live (or at least live most of the time) as solely or
even primarily as a wealth-creating asset.
24 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 523 (1997) (describing the rich relationship between occupation and social
life).
25 This is precisely the approach that the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has taken
with respect to their constitutional property right under article 14 of the basic law.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 14 (F.R.G.). The Court has created explicitly a hierar-
chical, categorical approach to property as a constitutional right based on distinctions drawn
among several different functions of property. The Court's basic view is that when the primary
function of the property interest in question is to provide for, or to protect, personal security,
such as protecting a place for one to live, that interest is entitled to greater weight and greater
protection. For a full discussion, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY 103-04, 139-47, 218-19 (2006).
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The third line of thought I want to offer is a thought experiment:
What if property had never been explicitly mentioned in the Ameri-
can Constitution? Would anything be different today? Since the
question is counterfactual, there is of course no definitive answer.
But as Mark Tushnet noted in his paper, "texts are available for pretty
much everything" today.2 6 There are a lot of textual candidates for
hosting a constitutional right to property. The Due Process Clause 7
and Privileges and Immunities Clause2s are just two that come quickly
to mind. Moreover, at least some aspects of the constitutional right
to property might have been protected via other constitutional provi-
sions that do not mention the term "property" at all. That is what has
happened in Canada, for example, whose Charter of Rights and
Freedoms does not mention property. 29 There was, as those of you
who are familiar with Canadian human-rights law know, an extended
and very heated debate over the precise question of whether to in-
clude property as an entrenched right, and the decision was not to do
so.3 There were a number of reasons for the decision, but one im-
portant consideration was that many participants in the debate
viewed protection of property as an entrenched right as unnecessary
because other provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
would protect some property against some form of governmental in-
terference. Moreover, under Canada's background private-law tradi-
tions and culture, property had achieved a sufficiently de facto en-
trenched status that formal entrenchment under the charter was
considered unnecessary.
We in the United States, of course, share much of Canada's legal
background, tradition, and culture. There are differences at the
margin but not really at the core. So if indeed the right to property is
protected as entrenched in Canada whether it was included in the
Charter of Rights or not, then quite possibly the United States would
not be in a different position today if there was no mention of prop-
erty in the Federal Constitution. Property would be an unenumer-
ated but still, in some sense, fundamental right.
26 Tushnet, supra note 3, at 213.
U.S. CONST. amend. XLV, § 1, cl. 3.
28 Id. cl. 2.
29 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I (Canada Act,
1982, ch. 11, sched. B (U.K.)), as reprinted in R.S.C. app. II, no. 44 (1985).
30 For a discussion of the debate and the protection of property under Canadian law, see
ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 40-49.
[Vol. 9:2
HeinOnline -- 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 482 2006-2007
